"Hitler's interference in projects such as the Me 262 jet were genuine reprieves for "us", and I just noted a documentary that described the 262's effect on bomber fleets as "devastating", up to 100 knots faster than anything else, and speed in the air in war is king. Fortunately, the jet didn't take to the air until the last days of the war, when the Luftwaffe was all but grounded as the Allies had turned off the fuel taps, and they only flew when they absolutely had to"

Further to Apollo's comment above, I thought the following might be of interest. I am not the author; I paraphrased it from an article in an aircraft magazine.

The story of the Me262-Production in the Reimahg.

In the spring of 1944 the aircraft factory in Walpersberg [mountain in Thüringen] was an accomplished fact. The alias, or the Code Name , was "Salmon".  Their official title was "RHEIMAHG",  which stood for: "REIchsMArschall Hermann Göring–Werke".

The Thüringer Gauleiter, Sauckel, had submitted the suggestion (a factory inside the mountain) to Göring, to extend, through Gustloff-Stiftung, the existing tunnel systems of the porcellain workings in the Walpersberg mountain near Kahla, for the production of aircraft or their parts. Göring supported the plan and ordered Sauckel to build the factory. With that, both of them knowingly by-passed the heirarchy of the Fighter Command Staff, of which, Hitler's Architekt Albert Speer, had become the leader.

In the meantime, it had become clear to the leadership they could not win back the Luftwaffe's dominance in the air equipped with the Focke Wulf Fw 190, All hopes rested on the Messerschmitt Me 262, the first jet fighter in the world ready to go into production. It outclassed  enemy fighter aircraft in speed and firepower, and was supposed to lead to a turning point in the air war.

The first take-off of a Messerschmitt in the REIMAHG followed on the 21st Feb.1945 at 13:15 hrs. The destination was Bay #13 at the Zerbst Airport, a military airport between Dessau and Magdeburg. Here, four 30mm canons, MK 108, were installed in the aircraft. According to existing records, at the start the production of the Me 262's ran according to plan. Four planes altogether were delivered in February, ten more planes in March, and twenty were supposed to be delivered in April. Up to December 1945, the monthly production was supposed to gradually run up to 750 Me 252's per month.

Up to the abandonment of production at the beginning of April, twenty-five aircraft were, for the most part, assembled out of delivered Messerschmitt parts, and said to have been finished. The last aircraft, work's number 110154, flown by Oberfeldwebel Gerhard Mittelstädt (currently living in Toronto), took off on April 8th 1945 at 16:15 hrs for Zerbst.

750 per month...wow! Yes, as Apollo says, it sure was fortunate the jet didn't take to the air until the last days of the war.

Deluded fantasy!

Oh, I'm referring to anyone over there seriously believing that 750 Me 262s could be produced on a monthly basis - NOT Dugald's account. Looks like a fine example of the propaganda machine in full swing. By that time, I think the Allies had all but strangled every supply line into the German war machine, and the country. What a number if they could have done it though.

I have some documentation which is probably not in general circulation, and will dig out some quotes.

Written by a chap called Stewart R Morrison, an air gunner on the Liberators of No 215 Squadron based in Calcutta and Dubulia.

The Allies had at least three encounters with the Me 263 before one of their pilots lived to describe its performance. He was Flight Lieutenant AE Walls who, on 25 July 1944, was on a photo recce mission from RAF Benson to the Munich/Stuttgart area. At 29,000 feet near Munich his Observer Flying Officer Lobban reported a strange twin-engined aircraft about 400 yards astern, Wall pushed forward the throttles of his 390 mph Mosquito but was shocked to find that the the enemy machine was still closing rapidly. Five times he took evasive action before finally losing his attacker in cloud 16,000 feet above the Tyrol.

In passing, it is interesting to note that two days after Wall and Lobban had their brush with an Me 262 of Erprobungskommando 262, No 616 Squadron at Manston received operational clearance to employ its Gloster Meteor Mk 1 fighters on 'Diver' sorties against the V-1 Flying Bombs.

The project for the aircraft, designated P1065, dates back to June 7, 1939, when the proposal was sent to the Reichluftfahrtminiterium - the State Aviation Ministry - in Berlin. Two BMW turbojet engines were specified, and the projected maximum speed was 560 mph. At this time, Professor Wily Messerschmitt had already spent some 18 months on the the project.

Delays due to redesign and engine changes meant the aircraft grew from 30 to 41 feet in wingspan, and was to be fitted with rocket engines like the Me 163 rocket fighter, but these engines were also delayed.

The aircraft first flew on April 18, 1941, powered by a Junkers Jumo 210G 12 cylinder 1,200 hp engine. Test pilot Flugkapitan Fritz Wendel later reported the aircraft was at least as good as a 109, better in some aspects - and this was in its configuration from the drawing board, with no modification being needed after the first test flight.

On March 25, 1942, the turbojets were fitted and the first flight was carried out with both these and the piston engine in use - no chances were being taken with aircraft or pilot. This made the aircraft heavy, and was at its maximum permitted weight, making take-off difficult and requiring the entire runway. Almost immediately, at 165 feet, the port engine cut, followed by the starboard engine. Only the piston engine prevented disaster with such a heavily loaded aircraft, and Wendel landed as soon as he could. Turbine blades in both engines had failed, a surprise for the engineers as the engines had been subject to extensive testing, and there was a further delay as the engines were completely redesigned.

On July 18, 1943, the team moved to a new airfield for the first purely jet-powered tests. A problem with the location of the tailplane almost ended the test flight before it began. Its position and angle meant it was stalled in the air from the fuselage and jet exhaust. Rather than abort, they came up with the idea of braking the aircraft at take-off speed - this would cause the it to nose forward and lift the tail out of the stall and into clean air - and could also cause a crash or make them run out of runway due to the speed reduction when braking. Wendel decided to risk the option, and at 08:40 made the first fully jet-powered flight of the Me 262 - 12 minutes. He repeated the exercise at 12:05.

As you might gather from the dates, the project was not being pushed along with any urgency. The picture is slightly misleading though, and while there was considerable interest, there were simply too many other projects being undertaken at the same time.

The Me-262 was also beset with engine problems, the fan blades had a short operational life before they became useless.  Also, the 262 was initially to be designed as a bomber due to some asinine plan.  Not to mention, the Germans had fuel problems, and finding plentiful fuel for these aircraft wasn't exactly easy.

I don't usually go for Wikipedia quotes on the basis the content is an indirecrt summary, but in this case, that's what I'm looking for:

Several components of the Me 262 were built in forced labour camps. The most noteworthy of these top-secret plants was B8 Bergkristall-Esche II at St. Georgen/Gusen, Austria, where inmates of Concentration Camp Gusen II produced fully equipped fuselages for the Me 262 at a monthly rate of 450 units on large assembly lines from early 1945. In the end, slightly over 1,400 Me 262s of all versions were produced. As few as 200 Me 262s made it to combat units due to fuel shortages, pilot shortages, and the lack of airfields that could support the Me 262 (concrete runways were recommended as the jet engines would melt tar runways).

The accounts of the prototypes in Wikipedia differ slightly from the much older account I have access to. Significantly, it numbers them from V1 to V4, while I have them registered as V0 top V3 (no relation to the V-weapons I'd add). I've only read the early part so far, for the previous post, and still have the later sections to read, and might past the salient points and dates once I have - it's much heavier reading that the first part, even though it's about the same length. Might even slip in a pic or two too.

Engine life was around 50 hours, but in reality only 12 hours was achieved - probably due to mis-management by the pilots, as experienced flyers coaxed around 20 hours from them. Throttle setting were critical and differed for high and low speed operation - and rapid changes could kill and engine. Later designs eased this problem through the use of autothrottle devices. Changeout was supposed to be three hours, but nine was realistic as the crews weren't trained or experienced, and... the parts weren't well enough made to fit first time (sabotage? ). Flight time was somewhere between 60 and 90 minutes, so there must have been a degree of crossed finger after that 13th flight was made.

There was a seldom documented design fault in the early engines, undiscovered until one pilot escaped the death that usually resulted, and was able to report the circumstances. The aircraft suffered a number of unexplained fatal crashes, and the report allowed a small part to be identified as the cause. Intended to help fuel fuel, it was found that certain conditions caused it to be displaced, permanently blocking the fuel and preventing any possibility of an engine restart in flight.

The 262 wasn't designed as bomber to begin with (where did that story come from? ). I have come across claims that the design started life as a fighter/bomber, but never found anything that backed them up, such as the P1065 original spec mentioned above, which is well documented. It was definitely a fighter from the outset, though the "started as fighter/bomber" claims suggest much of the delay in its final arrival arose from Der Führer's insistence (again, a favourite point of dispute/discussion) that it should be adapted for use as a bomber when he was shown the fighter (and who was going to say "No"? ), although the other delays in the project render this point moot, and it did operate as a fighter/bomber. Slung underneath the fuselage, the bomb load would have undoubtedly have limited the aircraft's capability.

The problem I mentioned (above) regarding take-off, requiring pilot to brake and tip the nose down to lift the tail out of the dirty airflow arose from the tail-dragger design adopted in the prototype, and was cured in later developments by fitting a tricycle undercarriage with nosewheel - so the aircraft was level - and eliminated when the final, fully retractable undercarriage was fitted in production.

Following Apollo's "Deluded fantasy!" comment, I took it upon myself to write to the author of the article about the REIMAHG inside-the-mountain aircraft factory. I asked the author if these expected production figures were really correct, or were they the result perhaps of a typo or something.. The following is his reply:

"Clearly, and I will gladly answer this question. According to the records of research scientists, who were engaged/employed with the REIMAHG,  there were supposed to be 750 aircraft, as of December 1945, actually delivered per month . Would that actually have been possible? I also don't believe it; the number sounds too unlikely. Even if the details of the logistics had worked correctly, it [the 750/month] is still very doubtful. The condition in which the factory found itself however, in addition, rendered it incapable [of this production]. The aircraft, which were finished, all made use of separate parts delivered from Messerschmitt... the REIMAHG was still incapable of producing some of the parts for the aircraft. [ At the end of the war] all the caverns inside the mountain were still under construction. "

It seems therefore, that Apollo's "deluded fantasy", is indeed an apt description of the REIMAHG's expected aircraft production... intended no doubt to help with the Propoganda Ministry's keep-your-chin-up campaign.

I might mention that the REIMAHG too, like those mentioned by Apollo in a subsequent post, was a forced labour camp.

Thanks for the extra detail Duguld.

I've no doubt the suggestion that the production figure of 750 aircraft per month was nothing more that rhetoric, sourced as you say from propaganda, a desire to placate Hitler (and avoid being stood against a wall with a free blindfold), or even a number that arose from Hitler himself, and which no-one was prepared to suggest wasn't possible, lest they win a blindfold.

I've been trying, unsuccessfully, to track down the peak U-Boat production numbers for comparison, as these were produced at a prodigious rate early in the war, when Germany had plenty of resources, to take part in the Battle of the Atlantic, and to cut of Britain's supply lines with America. While the production rates were given in a recent documentary, I can't recall the detail, so there's little point in me guessing the numbers as they could be daily or weekly. I do recall though that in terms of rate, the Germans were, at one stage, producing U-Boats faster then the Allies could destroy them - and this was when they were getting good at it and were doing so quite effectively, and it was thought that the battle with them might be lost. Fortunately they got even better at fighting them, and Germany couldn't keep up production to match. I can see that the Type VII was the workhorse, and became the most produce submarine, with over 700 examples built.

Going back to production figures, I just noticed that the V1 was intended to be despatched to Britain at the rate of 500 per day.

In total, only some 4,000 were sent - over 1,100 were destroyed by RAF flyers, while the American proximity fused anti-aircraft shell assisted by radar controlled guns were latterly eliminated as the passed over the British coast, with well over 90% being dealt with there. However, the early success of the weapon still saw 2,400 arrive in London.

Their toll was still less than it might have been, as the British had turned the German agents planted with the intent of feeding back targeting data of V1 strikes, and false information was transmitted back to Germany, causing the weapon to be wrongly configured, and be set to fall short of its intended target. While this still resulted in strikes, it prevented the Germans discovering the subterfuge, and adopting countermeasures to restore the landing points of their weapons to their intended targets.

Numerically, the more complex and advanced V2 was intended to be despatched at a rate of 50 per day from the factory under the concrete cupola, disabled but not destroyed by RAF bombing raids.

V2 was 20 times more expensive than V1, but still only carried 1 ton of explosive.

The secret A10 could have reached America.

While their ability to carry a nuclear weapon was questionable (and there wasn't actually one to deliver) it seems that the expense of these systems was vested in something more sinister than the simple delivery of a relatively small amount of explosive (1 ton was less than the largest bombs, British bombers carried 5 ton bombs), and the likelihood is that the they could have been loaded with nuclear material, spreading it over a large area, contaminating the land and people, eliminated them and diverting resources. Then there's the chemical and biological aspect of a small warhead with a big effect.

I have an old newspaper clipping that describes the V4, which was to have been packed with radioactive wast and targeted on London - the effect of only one such weapon would have been to produce the same level of radiation in London as the Hiroshima bomb. The same article suggests there was evidence that the the Hiroshima bomb was dropped to prevent the Japanese completing work on the V4.

The information was released by British nuclear expert Philip Henshall, who says he saw secret German papers which were confiscated by the Allies at the end of the war.

This dates back to 1995 - I wonder if it was ever followed up, or if any more details appeared? Or if it has been forgotten?

There's a lot of stuff here that i think belongs in the "Deluded fantasy" chapter Apollo. Can't prove it of course but it seems to include areas the Nazis were never really into at all. I'm referring of course to the nuclear material. I don't think there was any fear of them building a bomb before the Allies. much of what has been written by the German scientists who worked on nuclear stuff was bent on showing the Germans as being afraid of the international consquences of the damage nuclear bombs coud do to the earth, and this humane consideration was the  reason they gave up their search for the bomb...I don't know.

I don't know about the number of U-Boats either, but what i do recall at the end of the war, is how surprised i was after VE-Day regarding the number of German subs that were dropping into Scottish lochs to surrender. There seemed to be hundreds! Loch Eribol away up in the north seemed to be the busiest.


(?)  

The final number of U-Boats was surprisingly small, to my mind anyway, but I suppose their losses in the Atlantic, once the Allies had perfected their anti-submarine warfare techniques must have accounted for many. Bear in mind the production figure of 700 given for the Type VII alone, the final number of between 115 and 154 (dependent ons source) is tiny once you think of adding the production figure for all the other U-Boat types. The total for the whole of World War II was about 1,160 - again sources vary. And, it seems there were another 135 laid down, but never completed, which would have made the total almost 1,330.

I don't know if you've found it, but we've summarised the results of the recent survey carried out on the site of Operation Deadlight, which saw the last U-Boat scuttled to the west of Scotland and north of Ireland.

I can't quite see the Nazis or Hitler as being the types to have given any thought to humane consideration and given up the search for the atomic bomb on that basis - weren't the the same people hell bent on genocide and the elimination of the Jews in gas chambers and death camps? I think they managed to dispose of around 6,000,000 or so before they were stopped, and got the chance to start on the next lot they didn't like the look of.

The German bomb was stopped by Allied intervention, the Germans had all the bits necessary to make the most basic device, even though it is now clear that they were technically deficient in their methods and techniques of production, that would have been overcome in time - which they fortunately were not given. Given the right materials, and atomic (fission) bomb is relatively easy to produce, unlike its cousin, the nuclear (fusion) bomb is a completely different animal. The first didn't even need to be tested to prove the concept, but the second was quite different in terms of technical requirements, and that's why there was so much testing carried out by the Americans in the early days. That the V weapon development gave them the delivery system, just waiting for the payload is no great leap of imagination, and we only have to look at the Americans and Soviets a few years later, as the space programmes covered the development of the ballistic missile programmes inside the Cold War.

I'm afraid I've simply never heard anyone say or even hint that the Nazis or German scientist had any fear of the consequences of the bomb, part of the problem was that their early purges had emptied the country of many of its best scientist and thinkers - just look at the names of those involved in the Manhattan Project, and where many of them came from. In many respects, it's a good job the Third Reich was being run by what amounted to a madman with power, had he cultivated his available resources instead of persecuting them, things could have been very different today.

I tthought the "heavy water" plant in Norway had something to do with the development of nuclear weapons.

The SOE raid on the Vermork power station in Telemark has become a legend, and I hesitate to mention it as it has become legend and quoted so often.

What is less well known as a result is that this was only one of a series of raids and attacks made on the station to disrupt its operation, and the production of heavy water. Some of these actions were successful, while other were almost as spectacular disasters, and led to the loss of many involved.

The final blow to the German bomb was the sinking of the ferry transporting the last supply of heavy water from the station, across Lake Tinnsjø. This sinking sent all the tankers to the bottom of the lake, and is notable that it was authorised after consideration of the effect of sinking a ferry carrying civilians, and a number of Norwegians lost their lives when the ferry sank.

The use of heavy water rather then graphite as moderator for their reactors underlines the German lack of expertise I mentioned above, and even the heavy water they were manufacturing was of dubious quality for the job, and was typical of the whole project - all conceived without the necessary people or skills to see it through to completion on anything like the necessary timetable. Compared to the Manhattan Project, one of the largest scientific endeavours of all time, the German project was considerably underfunded and understaffed, and it is questionable whether Germany would have had the resources or concentrated research attention which the Allies used to produce such a weapon.

I might add, that when writing these accounts, I make a conscious effort to try and use terms such as Reich, Nazi, and German to distinguish between acts carried out by by the Reich, and perhaps the same acts when carried out by the German people, who were subject to life in a Totalitarian society, and obeyed or died as any enemy of the State would have. Whether or not I always get it right is another matter, but I like to think I try.

I don't think the V4 (or whatever of the other names it had) is one to join the "deluded fantasy" camp, as there have been significant facts coming to light in the postwar years that tie in with the German's lack of ability in the field of atomic physics, and the option of using outside assistance - again, whether or not this would have had any practical application in the time-scale concerned, given that the rest of the world was in what amounted to a headlong rush towards the same goal regardless of cost, is one for continued debate. In the end, it didn't matter.

Here's a couple of examples - the first one is the serious one, just in case it's not obvious

U-234

General notes on this boat:

U-234 suffered bomb damage while under construction in 1942. After the loss of U-233 in July 1944 it was decided not to use U-234 as a mine-laying boat. She was then rebuilt as a Japan-transporter. On 25 March 1945 they left Kiel and a few days later reached Kristiansand, Norway.

On 16 April, 1945 she left Norway and was enroute to Japan with extremely important cargo (drawings, a Me-262 jet fighter in crates and 560kg of uranium oxide, several high ranking German experts on various technologies and 2 Japanese officers) when Kptlt. Fehler, after hearing the cease-fire orders on May 4, 1945, decided to head for the USA and surrender.

Per tradition the Japanese men took their own life via sleeping pills rather than being captured.

Next, some interesting reading, not for the "facts" it claims to reports, but the skilful means by which the writer seamlessly blends a few facts with the results of whatever it he drinks, smokes, sniffs, or stick in his arm:

Reich of the Black Sun - Nazi Secret Weapons & The Cold War Allied Legend

It's prefaced with:

As a teenager I became fascinated with the history of World War Two, and particularly the European theater and the race for the atomic bomb. Physics was also an interest for me, and another oddity lodged in my mind as I read the standard histories: the United States had never tested the uranium bomb it dropped on Hiroshima.

If that's representative of Joseph P. Farrell Tulsa, Oklahoma's knowledge of (atomic) physics, then his writings should come with a warning to strap up your funny bone while reading the rest - it will need the support. For anyone not up to speed with their atomic physics, the Hiroshima bomb wasn't tested because there was no need to - it operated on basic atomic theory, and didn't use any complex or advanced physics packages that needed to be proven before use.

While the reaction is not atomic, the first bomb needed testing as much as a mixture of vinegar and bicarb would, in order to be sure it would froth up. Although it seems I should be referring to Polo mints being stuffed into bottles of fizzy drink nowadays, which seems to have the same effect, although I don't have these lying around to give it a try.

One of you will have to let me know  

I don't know about polo mints and fizzy drinks but I do know that if you give a bottle or can of fizzy drink a hard rap before opening it, it will not fizz over the top.  I have no idea why this works but I am sure I am about to find out.

Not from me, I've never had the opportunity to try it (cans = premium pricing), but I'll hazard a guess and suggest that the CO2 comes out of solution if the can is left to stand, hence makes a bid for freedom when it is opened, as all the gas bubbles, held tiny under the pressure of the sealed can, are released when the can is opened to atmosphere.

The sharp rap tends to break/burst them, making them much smaller than they already are, and they dissolve back into the liquid.

Don't quote that though, unless you take the time to go find the real answer - this one's just for fun

Dugald wrote:

"...much of what has been written by the German scientists who worked on nuclear stuff was bent on showing the Germans as being afraid of the international consequences of the damage nuclear bombs could do to the earth, and this humane consideration was the reason they gave up their search for the bomb"

Yes, of course the claim by German scientists  that they gave up attempts to build the "bomb" because of humane considerations is just rubbish and was never taken seriously by anyone, including the Germans. But this claim was made by the German scientists involved in the Nazi nuclear programme. I hope what I wrote above didn't give anyone the impression that I subscribed to this belief.

"...weren't the same people hell bent on genocide and the elimination of the Jews in gas chambers and death camps?"

No, I don't think so. I don't think the German scientists who worked on the development of nuclear material played any part of the "... genocide and the elimination of the Jews" you mention here Apollo. I think they were just scientists like those who worked on the other "Wunderwaffen", like the VI and the VII, scientists no different I'd guess, from the British scientists for example, who designed Britain's anti-civilian weapons. They went around with their heads in a scientific cloud and gave not a twit for the pros and cons of what they did, only the scientific success of it.

"...it is questionable whether Germany would have had the resources or concentrated research attention which the Allies used to produce such a weapon".

I'm not too sure what the meaning of this is. Certainly during the latter part of the war they lacked the resources required for building a "bomb"; I am assuming  "resources" refers to hardware as opposed to human resources. However in the realm of "would have had", if the "concentrated research attention" means they lacked the human resources, then I disagree. I believe the German scientists could have duplicated the human resources and brains, used on the  Manhattan Project to develop the "bomb". And, by the way, in the same realm of "would have had", so could Britain. The Americans have/had no monopoly on scientific brains and capability. One need only take a look at the weapons the Germans developed during the war and to which they devoted "concentrated research attention"... weapons not matched by the Allies.

I still can't think of any instances or reports where German scientists gave up attempts to build the bomb on the basis of humane considerations. Had any done so during the war, I'm sure they would have been placed against the nearest wall, or more likely beside a pit and shot, while the next batch of recruits to the project looked on as an incentive to concentrate on their work, and not think. Since the many were coerced by the few, the matter of belief or disbelief of the suggestion is moot.

Just a little bit of terminology, I think, and probably really runs on from the above. When I say "people" in such contexts as this where the will of individual is of no consequence, then I am referring to the master, the Reich, Nazis, whatever one wishes to call those in control. Weapons etc only become anti-civilian in the hands of the user, not the creator. Pitchfork or spear? We use thousands of tons of explosive today, blowing up quarries, but some still like to use a few kilos to modify public places. Kitchen knife or Commando fighting knife? Nuclear energy or nuclear bombs? As with the point above, you can't suppress knowledge. You may delay it, but you can't un-invent it, and suggesting scientists have their heads in the clouds is demeaning, although they have little interest in the pros and cons, but that's largely because they know that it makes no difference. They're not the bosses or the end users. Even if they found the a real Doomsday Weapon, burnt their notes and all killed themselves, unlike a Hollywood movie that would have you believe that was the end of it, they know that after a short time, someone else would be along a little later, with virtually the same idea.

Germany had neither the financial, physical, technical or human resources to produce an atomic bomb by 1945 - dare I say proven by what the Allies found when they raided all the German atomic research and development sites. The findings were that the materials - uranium, enriched uranium, plutonium, heavy water, deuterium, triggers, and just about everything else were of such poor and variable quality that the chances of enough usable material being available to produce a viable device were minuscule. As we already know from the conventional weapons programmes, for example the Me 262, their technology was sorely lacking by that time, and the country was cut off and bankrupt, so they weren't going to be able to buy in anything better. In terms of people, they had run out of their own labour, with almost anyone that could hold a gun being conscripted, and German workers reportedly outnumbered by forced or slave labour in a ratio of 1 German to 4 slaves - not the best for producing anything that needed care. Again, stressing the "At the time" aspect, Germany had purged all its thinkers at the start of the war, and many of the brightest were Jewish or non-German, so had fled the country for fear of their lives. This meant the remaining brains may have been capable, and may have produced a bomb, but there was nothing there even remotely like the Manhattan Project, which the Americans were able to fund as one of the most expensive projects in history. Germany "At the time" could match or come close, and only the Russians managed to match the Americans - or rather copy the Americans since they seemed to have as many spies as the Americans had workers.

If Hitler had not purged the country of its thinkers, bankrupted and isolated its facilities, forced its thinkers to flee, and had left someone to do the work, then I have no doubt it could have come up with a bomb, and that it would have worked, but not by or in 1945, not by the wildest stretch of the imagination.

What surprises me, and continues to do so given the Me 262 story, is that the V2 made to near completion, and worked. Looking at the innovative technology it used, in particular the guidance and control, make it a remarkable achievement. Although, that might also underline what they were good at - the V2 was conventional engineering, innovative, but conventional nonetheless. The bomb however, was physics, and that's not done with a lathe, production line, or slave.

"I still can't think of any instances or reports where German scientists gave up attempts to build the bomb on the basis of humane considerations."

Then there are still some items of written material you have yet to read.

"Had any done so during the war, I'm sure they would have been placed against the nearest wall..."

To the best of my recollection, they were written after the war.

"Since the many were coerced by the few, the matter of belief or disbelief of the suggestion is moot"

I don't understand this part.

"Weapons etc only become anti-civilian in the hands of the user, not the creator."

When a scientist is asked to develop a 12000 lb high explosive bomb that will explode on the surface with little ground penetration, with the intention of doing more surface damage in a built-up area, then this creator would have to be stupid to leave the blame all to the user. Likewise, the scientist who developed the explosive device to destroy the German Möhne dam, knew exactly what his bomb would be used for... is this creator more innocent than those who delivered the explosive device? Hmmmmm? C'mon Apollo, they have to keep their heads in a 'scientific cloud' in order to carry out their nasty jobs. There's nothing demeaning in this suggestion at all, on the contrary, and it's been a music hall joke for donkeys!

"You may delay it, but you can't un-invent it,..."

This point here is a bit beyond me.

"Germany had neither the financial, physical, technical or human resources to produce an atomic bomb by 1945"

I cannot disagree with this statement, and if I gave the impression I thought otherwise, then I did a lousy job of expressing my thoughts. What nuclear information the Allies found in Germany, or at least what we have been led to believe the Allies found in Germany, dated from the early years of the war and are comparable not with post-Manhatten knowledge, but with say, 1942 knowledge. The Nazi interest had started to dwindle by this time.

The Me 262 was, despite the very trying conditions under which it was built, tested, and used, reflects very highly indeed, on their technology. I am referring here to the developing technology, not that of the factory worker. This lack of capable factory workers reflects not at all on the level of technology used in the development stages of the aircraft.

"Germany had purged all its thinkers at the start of the war, and many of the brightest were Jewish or non-German, so had fled the country".

Yes, there had been a forced exodus of many bright people, but to say Germany had been purged of all its thinkers at the start of the war is a gross exaggeration, in fact it's untrue. The technical developments achieved and used by Germany during the war attest rather strongly to my claim that your statement is false.

"...there was nothing there even remotely like the Manhattan Project,.."

This of course is true, in fact, I'd label it commonsense true; that there was, never entered my head.

" or rather copy the Americans since they seemed to have as many spies as the Americans had workers".

Now you'd have a job with this assertion Apollo!

"Although, that might also underline what they were good at - the V2 was conventional engineering, innovative, but conventional nonetheless. The bomb however, was physics, and that's not done with a lathe, production line, or slave"

I'd label it very "far fetched" to say the VII in the early forties was conventional engineering; to suggest further, that it was simply done by means of a  "lathe, production line,  or slave labour" is an overuse of the hyperbole. I'd I'd say exactly the same thing with regard to the guided aircraft bomb and the VI.

You do have to wonder what would have happened if Karl Doenitz had got his wish regarding the Kriegsmarine.  

Essentially he knew that Raeder's plan to try and play catch up with the RN in terms of capital ship numbers was hopeless, unlike other countries, they didn't even have any older WW1 era hulls to upgrade like Britain had with the excellent Queen Elizabeth class, but all they had were two ancient Pre-Dreadnoughts.

Doenitz wished for the majority of the Kriegsmarines resources to be put into U-Boat's, also to cease production ASAP of the relatively useless Type-II Coastal U-Boat which didn't even have a deck gun and only a couple of torpedo tubes.  Increased research and development might have brought in more advanced types earlier.

Yes JadeFalcon, one might well wonder about that. If old Karl had got his wish we might all have been sieg-heiling. The time and effort spent on such German warships as the Bismark and Tripitz, I'm sure would have been much more cost effective if they had been spent on submarines. The period from mid 1941 to mid 1942 was very critical for the survival of Britain, and it was the pounding Britain was taking in the Batttle of the Atlantic. Our merchant ships were being sunk at a rate far greater than Britain could build them... and for us that was heading straight for a major disaster. A few more powerful U-Boat fleets following in the wake of their shipyard research and development,  might well have given them a victory. They didn't of course, and we eventually won.

I don't think Hitler was ever very keen on Admiral Raeder (maybe Hitler never forgave him for the bout of sea-sickness he suffered when he went to sea in one of his new warships!). Dönitz was, I believe, a favourite of Hitler's. Yet knowledge of this relationship came as such a surprise when Hitler appointed him his successor in April 1945. I have never read or heard of any person who forecast this relationship.

I suppose of all the arms of the Wehrmacht, the Kriegsmarine was the least indoctrinated with all the Nazi rubbish, and  I don't think Dönitz was of the wicked-Nazi ilk. If I recall correctly, he got  ten years at the Nuremberg War Crimes trial, and I don't think he ever deserved this. I have forgotten what it was he was found guilty of, but I have a feeling it had to do with maritime crimes which were also practiced by Allied submariners. The war cost him a lot personally, I believe he lost two sons in the German U-Boat service.

I don't think Hitler held any emnity towards Raeder, since when Raeder tried to resign Hitler tried to persuade him otherwise.  Instead of resigning, Raeder then held the honourary role of Inspector General.

From Wiki on Doenit'z trial at Nuremberg

"Following the war, Dönitz was held as a prisoner of war by the victorious Allies, who accused him of war crimes. He was indicted as a major war criminal at the Nuremberg trials on three counts: (1) conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; (2) Planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression; and (3) crimes against the laws of war. Among the war-crimes charges, he was accused of waging unrestricted submarine warfare for issuing War Order No. 154 in 1939, and another similar order after the Laconia Incident in 1942, not to rescue survivors from ships attacked by submarine. By issuing these two orders he was found guilty of causing Germany to be in breach of the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936.  However, as evidence of similar conduct by the Allies was presented at his trial, his sentence was not assessed on the grounds of this breach of international law.  Dönitz was found not guilty on count of the Indictment, but guilty on counts and  and was sentenced to ten years in prison."

If you read up on the Laconia incident, I can't blame Doenitz for issueing that order.  Namely a U-Boat was towing some lifeboats from the Laconia and also had wounded prisoners on deck.  There was a red cross on the deck marking it as basically helping seamen.  A USN aircraft still attacked the U-Boat.  Doenitz then said his crews weren't to place themselves in such a position again.

Interesting JadeFalcon. I wonder how many of the Allied nations would have been found innocent of  "conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity"? Not any if my memory serves me.

Yes, the Laconia affair was a sad conclusion to a genuine attempt to save lives. Strange, that to this day the crew of this American aircraft has never been discovered, well it has never been made public anyway. Thinking about this brings to mind the great loss of life when the Bismark went down with so many Allied ships available to rescue the German sailors...... Yes, I know, there were German submarines reported in the neighbourhood.

Excuse brevity, just flitting through, but the American aircraft, crew, and personnel involved in the Laconia incident were identified, and escaped prosecution, while Donitz was. A little case of selective myopia?

http://www.uboataces.com/battle-laconia.shtml

The next morning, September 16, at 11.25am, this concentration of U-boats was spotted by an American B-24 Liberator bomber operating out of Ascension island. The survivors waved and the U-boats signaled for help. As Red Cross flags were draped over their decks, the pilot Lieutenant James D. Harden turned away and radioed back to base for instructions. The officer on duty that day Captain Robert C. Richardson III replied with the order to attack.

Half an hour later, Harden flew back and the survivors felt a sigh of relief on seeing the returning aircraft. They had expected a drop of supplies, of the much needed food and medicine. Instead, they were attacked with a concentration of bombs and depth charges. One bomb landed amidst a lifeboat and hundreds perished during that attack. U-156 was slightly damaged and forced to submerge, leaving hundreds of victims struggling in the water. All the submarines dived and escaped, although U-506 and U-507 returned to the area later, unwilling to desert the people they had saved. Fortunately, Vichy French warships from Dakar arrived the next day and picked up the remaining survivors, so the loss of life from the American action was contained. In total, there were about 1,621 deaths with 1,111 survivors, including those already taken aboard the overcrowded U-boats. This incident left a foul bitterness in the U-boat war that would cast a long shadow over Donitz and his seamen.

The action of Captain Richardson was considered by many as a war crime, although no formal charges were ever placed. As a result of this incident, Admiral Donitz issued an order forbidding U-boats from attempting any rescues and furthermore, from providing any assistance whatsoever to survivors of submarine attacks. He was quoted to say “no attempt of any kind must be made to rescue the crews of ships sunk”. This order became to be known as the “Laconia Order”. Up until now, it was common for U-boats to aid survivors of their attack by providing provisions and pointing out the direction closest to land. Despite the order, some U-boat commanders continued in their practice to aid survivors of their attacks.

After the war, Donitz stood trial for war crimes and the Laconia order was used as a basis of indictment against him. Most surprisingly, he received support from some of the most respected figures in the US Navy, Admital Chester Nimitz who came to his defense and said that the United States had operated under the same engagements of unrestricted warfare. Despite the evidence of allied practice, Donitz was convicted of war crimes by the Nuremberg Tribunal and sentenced to 11 and a half years in prison. The U-boat crews deeply resented this action and felt that they were being prosecuted for the threat they had posed to the allies rather than for war crimes.

Lieutenant James D. Harden turned away and radioed back to base for instructions. The officer on duty that day Captain Robert C. Richardson III replied with the order to attack.

Great stuff Apollo, I enjoyed reading your articale about the Laconia very much. I'd always thought the Yankee crew had remained unknown. I think this fellow Richardson should have been tried as a war criminal. And, since the pilot of the plane turned back after spotting the U-Boats, he must have recognized the situation for what it was. He too, should have been tried as a war criminal. Obeying orders wasn't generally accepted as an excuse at Nuremberg.

Wonder if Harden received a gong for his actions... like the caprtain of the ship which shot down the Iranian airliner full of civilian pilgrims.

I really don't know why Doenitz was tried as such.  I know the 'obeying orders' doesn't cut it, but for the most part, the Kriegsmarine fought a relatively clean war.

I've often heard the Nuremberg trials are really considered a bit of a travesty, and while some people like Julius Streicher for instance deserved what they got, others like Field Marshall's Jodl and Keitel I'm not so sure of.  I also read Eugene Birds book on Rudolf Hess in Spandau, and while it dragged a bit in places it was a rather fascinating read.

A question, it mentions in that book as well as elsewhere that Raeder and Doenitz just didn't get on with each other, any reason why?

JadeFalcon said:
"I don't think Hitler held any emnity towards Raeder, since when Raeder tried to resign Hitler tried to persuade him otherwise.  Instead of resigning, Raeder then held the honourary role of Inspector General."

William Shirers' "Rise & Fall..." (page 1292), informs us that "Hitler had become furious with Raeder". This was because of Raeder's failure to prevent the Allied convoys getting through to Russia in 1942/43. Hitler and Raeder had a "stormy showdown" on Jan 6th, 1943, and H. accused R. of "a lack of will to fight". Raeder asked to be relieved and Hitler accepted his resignation, and replaced him with Karl Dönitz.

According to Shirer, Raeder received a life sentence at Nuremberg.

Sorry, but I'm not very good at the micro-analysis reply so this takes me ages...

Then there are still some items of written material you have yet to read. - To the best of my recollection, they were written after the war.

I was hoping for a reference, but if they were written after the war, then do they really matter?

"(Since the many were coerced by the few, the matter of belief or disbelief of the suggestion is moot)" I don't understand this part.

What's not to understand about the elite few of the SS and Gestapo organised under Hitler's top table, herding the mass of German population, and the countries he conquered, with the ultimate power of life and death they could wield arbitrarily?

Coincidentally, today I listened to the story of a Jewish artist running an art class in Germany in the 1930s. His newest pupil arrived in full uniform, armed, and the class was over - for ever.

"(Weapons etc only become anti-civilian in the hands of the user, not the creator)." the scientist who developed the explosive device to destroy the German Möhne dam, knew exactly what his bomb would be used for...

Honestly, this is a subject all on its own, and is finely crafted in semantics. I could point out that when the Möhne dam-busting bomb was designed, the motivation was to destroy the dam and halt or disrupt arms production and save Allied lives. As opposed to smash the dam and kill as many civilians below Möhne dam as possible. I don't think we can do a subject such as this justice here, but agree that is complex - and ultimately needs courts and lawyers to resolve.

"(You may delay it, but you can't un-invent it,...)"  This point here is a bit beyond me.

C',mon Duguld In plain English, one may have the bright idea of assassinating Einstein, Oppenheimer, Von Braun, Baird, Barnes-Wallis etc etc and destroying their work as part of a cunning plan to win the war, and the idealist might believe that in doing so they would also stop the atomic bomb, ballistic missile, television, radar, or whatever. The point was simply that while this action may delay the arrival of the invention, if we look at the example of the invention of television given above, and the various pioneers involved, then the result is simply delay, not un-invention by removing the inventor. Another one will be along in a moment, as it were. (Delay may still be pivotal).

Turning briefly to the Me 262, the only new technology was the engine, Messerschmitt has already mastered the aluminium mononcoque airframe in the 1930s with the Me 109. Their technical development on the new jet engine was so poor that the first engines fitted failed immediately under flight conditions, despite extensive pre-flight bench tests, and there was a delay of more than a year after that first failure while they were totally redesigned. Stems from no people and no resources.

"(Germany had purged all its thinkers at the start of the war, and many of the brightest were Jewish or non-German, so had fled the country)". Yes, there had been a forced exodus of many bright people, but to say Germany had been purged of all its thinkers at the start of the war is a gross exaggeration, in fact it's untrue. The technical developments achieved and used by Germany during the war attest rather strongly to my claim that your statement is false.

Indeed, as they had very few thinkers left by the start of the war, I was actually referring back to the real beginning, 1933:

Germany was now led by a self-educated, high school drop-out named Adolf Hitler, who was by nature strongly anti-intellectual. For Hitler, the reawakening of the long-dormant Germanic spirit, with its racial and militaristic qualities, was far more important than any traditional notions of learning.

Before Hitler, German university towns had been counted among the world's great centers of scientific innovation and literary scholarship. Under Hitler, Germany's intellectual vitality quickly began to diminish. Truth, rational thinking and objective knowledge, the foundation stones of Western civilization, were denounced by Nazified students and professors in favor of mysticism, speculation and collective thinking toward a common goal - the pursuit of a glorious future for Germany.

This page summarises what I had in mind here The Burning of Books. I can't quote the whole thing here, but it shows where most of the brains gone from Germany by the start of the war.

More later

"Sorry, but I'm not very good at the micro-analysis reply"

I'm not too sure why you said this Apollo, but anyway, just let me explain that when writing  a long post I have trouble keeping track of what I have written and what I haven't written, and the "step approach" helps me stay on course. I thought also, that it helped the reader to follow what has been written, but hearing it described as 'micro-analysis' leaves me wondering.

"I was hoping for a reference, but if they were written after the war, then do they really matter?"

Yes, I am aware of the weakness in claims unsubstantiated by names, titles, etc.; nevertheless, I know I did read that German nuclear scientist(s) claimed they gave up further pursuit of the "bomb" for  humane considerations. (And I reiterate: I believe the German claim is just rubbish.)

Now Apollo, in answer to your question,  

"do they [the German claims] really matter?"

Well they do in the context of why my statement was made in the first place: it could well have been a post-war ploy by the scientist(s) to show the Germans were not all of what the concentration camps perhaps led some people to believe.

We might also note that all scientists were not happy about the results of the Manhattan Project. Niels Bohr for example, wanted to tell the Soviet Union all the Allies knew about nuclear weapons in order to minimise the chances of nuclear war. There was, for a long time after the use of the 'bomb', pretty strong agitation against the development of nuclear weapons...indeed there is, even today.

"Coincidentally, today I listened to the story of a Jewish artist running an art class in Germany in the 1930s. His newest pupil arrived in full uniform, armed, and the class was over - for ever."

I really don't see what the persecution of the Jews in Germany has to do with the subject under discussion.

"I could point out that when the Möhne dam-busting bomb was designed, the motivation was to destroy the dam and halt or disrupt arms production and save Allied lives."

This, I'm perfectly happy to accept as an absolute fact, and point out once again, that those who developed the explosive device to destroy the German Möhne dam, knew exactly that this is what the device would be used for. One may dress the above outlined motivation in all the prose one wishes, but the statement "Weapons etc only become anti-civilian in the hands of the user, not the creator." is patently incorrect: the 'user' in the Lancaster was no more guilty than the scientist.

"(You may delay it, but you can't un-invent it,...)" This point here is a bit beyond me.

I now understand the plain English explanation... sorry 'bout that.

"Turning briefly to the Me 262,"

The failures mentioned in the development of the Me 262 are not uncommon in the development of aircraft. The British Meteor for example, starting from Whittle's development of the engine went through many problems before it ever went into production. I have recently read about Jan Zurakowski's test flights with the Gloster Meteor, and his eventual separation from the company because of technical problems. And of course who can forget de Haviland. Nah, Germany is not the only nation to experience trouble with new aircraft. To state Germany had purged all its thinkers at the start of the war is not true, and I still believe the development of the world's first operational jet, the Me 262, offers a fair measure of support for my assertion.

"Before Hitler, German university towns had been counted among the world's great centers of scientific innovation and literary scholarship...."

I have no wish to be put into a position of seeming to defend Hitler or Nazi Germany, nor do I wish to read about the burning of books; and, a discussion of the German persecution of the Jews is also a bit beyond my interest.

You have to be less selective - my recollection of the Jewish artist had nothing to do with Jewish persecution. The fact of the story was the SS soldier (or whatever he may have been) arriving and using his arbitrary power to shut down an art class he saw as contrary to his doctrine.

"the 'user' in the Lancaster was no more guilty than the scientist."

Er, those in the Lancaster are not 'users' - Britain and its Governement, acting on behalf of its people are the 'users' in this context.

There seems to be a misapprehension that I'm slating the German effort in developing the Me 262 - quite the opposite, and I still have part 2 of the story to paraphrase soon. I used it as an example intended to show that they were still able to develop with the minimal capability they were left with and had to build on, but the fact that they barely developed one variant proves my point. At the same time, the Gloster Meteor was being developed, meeting and tackling similar problems, and following multiple variants, including a vertical take-off model that liked to melt runways - so nobody's perfect. It was also initially forbidden to fly to Germany, lest it be downed and captured, so was deployed against the V1 rather than in combat. There was another tiny problem when it did fly there, as "we" would try and shoot it down since it looked line a 262.

"The Burning of Books" is the title of the article referred to, and contains much more. And the persecution of Jews, or rather German Jews in this case, led to most of Germany's brains being eliminated, or chased from the country long before the war.

That's two counts of Jewish persecution dismissed - is there something I should be avoiding?

Oh, sorry about the "micro-analysis", but us webby types (which I'm told I am, so better not fight it ) interpret quoted points as specific details to be analysed alone - a bit like typing ALL IN CAPS is a like SHOUTING! Now I know better, I'll wind myself back down into waffle mode, and stay less focussed and more generalised

Read the rest at last:

Me 262 - Part 2. based on Stuart R Morrison's account.

Continuing my little tribute to the brilliant, but fatally flawed, world's first jet fighter which despite its deficiencies, showed the piston engined fighter to be dead - imagine if there had been enough brains left in Germany to develop it earlier. In spring 1943, German Ace General Adolf Galland flew a prototype, returning from the first flight to say, "It's as if an angel were pushing".

Earlier, I mentioned a problem that led to fatal crashes throughout the life of the 262, and wrongly mentioned the fuel supply as the problem - having read the detail, it was actually the engine air supply. Without the resources to track this problem to source, the Germans never solved this problem. After the war, the Americans ordered Ludwig Hofman (famous pilot) to ferry a 262, and during this flight an engine cut. Although he restarted, he could not recover the dive but, having been at high altitude, had been able to force his way out of the cockpit before the aircraft powered into the ground. His account revealed that a body inside the jet-tube - intended to optimise efficiency - could fail, and be shot to the back of the tube and close it off. This created excess drag, hence the sideslip and dive, and blocked the airflow to the tailplane, which meant no control and explained why the condition could not be recovered.

Demonstrating the prototype to Göring in spring 1943 proved to be a mistake. He arranged for it to be shown to Hitler in November 1943, at Intersburg Air Base in East Prussia. Also impressed, but obsessed with thoughts of retaliation foe Allied bombing, he asked if it could carry a 1,000 kg bomb - to which Messerschmitt was obliged to answer "Yes".

In May 1944, Hitler issued an order for the 262 to used as a high speed bomber. The result was the effective loss of the 262 for 1944, as it was pressed into an role for which it was not suited. Development and flight testing consumed valuable time that could have been better spent, as the aircraft's limitations meant its range for such missions was a mere 60 miles from its operating base.

At the same time, operational units were still being formed. Erprobungkskommando 262 trained pilots and developed operational tactics, downing two Mosquitos and a Lighting during exercises. Disbanded when its leader was killed action, Ekdo 262 reformed as Kommando Nowotny, under Luftwaffe ace Major Walther Nowotny, with the specific mission of intercepting US daylight bombers. Despite the advanced nature of its equipment, lack of resources meant it was less than successful. On its second day of operation, Hauptmann Alfred Teumer (leader of the second Staffen) was killed when his aircraft crashed due to engine failure while landing. There were continued losses, and Nowotny succumbed to the dive problem, being seen to plunge through cloud cover and into the ground at over 500 mph. Pilots were simply untrained, some making only two flights before being sent into action. Although Kommando accounted for 22 Allied aircraft (plus 4 probable), the cost was 26 Me 262s and pilots.

Two thirds of 262 crashes were attributed to mechanical failure (quite apart from the training failures). The engine design was never sorted, leading to a 26,000 foot ceiling to minimise the risk of flame-out and compressor stall. The tailplane structure was liable to fail, and the undercarriage to collapse on landing, due to the high speed.

By spring 1945, the golden opportunity offered by the 262 had been lost, and even its advances could not combat Allied mastery of the air. Some 1,500 had been built in the last months of the was, including the radar equipped night fighter - a spectacular achievement given the daily bombing raids which interrupted production - but the increasing accuracy of the Allied bombers meant the factories were always sustaining damage.

Fritz Wendel summed things up by saying, "It was born too late". However, it was not so much the late birth as the German leadership's inability to make a timely and correct assessment of the 262's potential which led to the Luftwaffe being denied its last chance of countering the Allies' massive air superiority.

Jagdverband 44 served a brief but distinguished career, and had some 95 262s at Munich, operating from a runway created on a concreted centre section of the Munich/Augsburg Autobahn. JV44 proved the efficacy of the R4M unguided 5 cm air-to-air missile, launched at a distance of 650 yards (outside the range of bombers' defensive machine guns), an attack formation of nine 262s each armed with 24 missiles could quickly fill an area the size of a football pitch with shrapnel.

JV44 transferred to Salzburg-Maxlam, and surrendered to American forces on May 3, 1945.